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THEORY AND PRACTICE IN BANKING SUPERVISION: SOME REFLECTIONS BY
EDWARD P .M. GARDENER, INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN FINANCE, UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES, RESEARCH PAPERS IN BANKING AND FINANCE,
NO. RP86/2, JUNE, 1986
major commodity traded in the market is subject to monopoly control by the Central Bank. Also, the assumptions
that: firms are selling their products at lowest price, no
firm is earning any excess profit or monopoly rent, new
entrants are encouraged by the rising profits until excess
profits are eliminated, may not hold. This is because the
banking system is built on confidence - a small bank failure
can have a significant and far-reaching effect on the economy.
Market deregulation may suggest an improvement in the
efficiency of the system, but unfortunately, we have not
seen this from experience. This is an observable fact, rather
than a premise. This is why supervision is designed to help
prevent exceptional and essential distortions in the system.
The author thinks, however, that the role of the market
in the regulation of banks cannot be over-looked. Even
though the market premise may be criticised, the failures,
inefficiencies and competition in the system exposed by
the market are met with prompt supervisory responses like
granting of licensing to protect banks from high competition.
Insuring the depositors funds against risk by introducing
a flat rate of deposit insurance for banks is a way of encouraging stability in the system. Therefore, despite the shortcomings of the market premise, market still helps to expose
structural inefficiencies in the system which invariably
call for adequate regulations.
Because the market has an important role to play in
resource allocation through the price mechanism, the role of
the regulators are also very important. This, the author said,
can be seen in the way regulators respond to some of the
short-comings of the market by ensuring efficient regulation
of the banks and the market in which they operat,e. Good
supervision therefore, does not necessarily have to be a
particular system of supervision. The system of bank regulation in any country is a product of their past experiences.
l11e job of the regulators is to see that banks conform with
the laid-down rules and are .run in a prudent manner. To
be able to do this. a supen-isory system that will ensure
banking stability and also allow price-market mechanism
to work efficiently must be developed. Because of the
problems of information and risk-exposures, it has become
necessary to have a supervisory authority who will act as a
perfectly informed market. The authority is to receive all
relevant information and data on the banks and use them
for decision-making.
The final section concludes the paper by trying to show
that the role of theory in bank regulation is to help us handle
and understand the fact. This will also help us to have insight
into what is happening in the real world and lead us to
formulating appropriate policy to deal with the problem
However, according to the author, there is always a problem
when it comes to using theory to deal with the real world.
This is where the regulators are relevant, since failures can
not be prevented by theory alone. While theory is essential
in order to understand and be able to attend to the basic
problem of the system, the regul<1.tors are needed to look
into the causes and how to solve the problem identified.

The paper, Theory and Pactice in Banking Supervision,
was written by Edward P.M. Gardener of the Institute of
European Finance. University College of North Wales,
Bangor and published in Research Papers in Banking and
Finance. The author examines the broad role of theory and
practice in banking supervision by looking at the economic
nature of regulation and the justification for regulation in
the banking system. The paper is divided into eight sections
with a conclusion. Sections I and 2 deal with the background
and definition of regulation generally in the economic system
and how it applies to the banking system. Sections 3 & 4
deal with the primary aim of supervision and the role of
information in bank regulation. Sections 5 & 6 examine
the place of market economic theory and its relevance to
the system while sections 7 & 8 look at the influence of
the market and try to reconcile the theory and practical
experience in banking regulation.
In section 2, the author defines regulation as a form of
command and control. This is to suggest that we are not
dealing with pure economic matters. However. lawyers and
economists have different views as to how regulation should
be implemented. While legal practitioners favour legislative
process, economists however think it should be through the
market. Since there is no universal definition of regulation,
the author thinks that regulation can be referred to as
control over what economic units do. and how they do it.
Section 3, shows that in providing an answer to the inability of the market alone to improve the society's welfare,
economic theory and practical supervision often clash. The
author sees banking supervision as very important for preserving confidence in the banking system. It is also believed
that even in a free enterprise economy, regulation is needed
to correct certain market anomalies. For example, in the
banking system, regulations may be used to prevent merger,
promote competition and even encourage or discourage
new entry into the market.
The author noted in section 4 that lack of information
is the cause of most market failures including bank collapse.
It is lack of information about the soundness of a bank that
often leads to the withdrawal of funds from the bank by
depositors when liquidity problem is noticed. l11is information deficiency has led to the rationale for supervision.
The premise on which the market economy is built is
that under perfect competition, marginal cost is equal to
marginal revenue at the point where welfare is maximised.
This idea has made economists believe in the market as the
most efficient allocator of resources rather than rely on the
commands and controls of regulation. The author is of the
view that since there is no empirical evidence to support
free market as a good allocator of resources, it can safely
be said that free market is not a replacement or substitute for
external regulatory agency.
In examining the validity of the perfect competition
model premise on practical banking markets, the a•.ithor
noted that a condition of perfect or near-perfect co· :;petition
in banking markets does not exist since money which is the
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l11erefore, it will be wrong to draw a distinct line between
theory and practice. They are both needed if concrete
achievement is to be made.
The issue examined by the author has been a very controversial topic among economists and bankers. l11e experiences
of bank failures in the recent past in several countries have
undoubtedly increased concern over banking supervision.
The resulting debate has been on whether to intensify regulation or to allow the market to instil discipline on ailing
banks. The currently observed illiquidity of some banks in
Nigeria has kept this debate ~live in the country.
I consider the complementary nature of market force
and regulation as a way out of the problem of the banks.
The paper has already shown how one complements the
other. While it is expected that the debate will continue, I
hope that bank regulators will find the paper useful in
blending theory and regulation.
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